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Abstract
Profit and Loss (PLS) sharing contracts in Islamic finance are considered to be
fair economic practices as they focus on sharing profits and losses between the
project’s participants. This mode, however, suffers from asymmetric information
in the form of moral hazards and adverse selection. The purpose of this paper is
to reduce moral hazards by developing an equilibrium profit sharing ratio’s span
of negotiation in a PLS contract involving a financier and a entrepreneur. We aim
to establish an agent based model that will help the financier decide whether to
accept financing a contract. We make use of game theory techniques and we test
our results using an agent based simulation tool (Netlogo). We found theoreti-
cal evidence that a Nash equilibrium span of negotiation, for both profit sharing
ratios, can be developed which is both rational and incentive compatible to both
participants. However, the simulation tool suggests that despite the existence of an
average positive span of negotiaton , financial contracts might not be extendes if
the number of void contracts in a simulation exceeds a specefied threshold. The
usefulness of the agent based simulation tool has added value to our theoritical
finding by suggesting when PLS contracts can or con’t be signed.
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1. Introduction
Profit and Loss contracts are partnerships agreement in which profits are shared
according to a pre-specified ratioObaidullah (2005) while losses are born subject to
each party capital contribution. Free consent of the partners and their full capacity
are required before the signing of a contract Usmani and Ansari (2010).
In case of a partnership of more than two, one or more of the parties may act
as agent or managers. It can also be agreed that management can be undertaken by
one rather than all parties Warde (2010).
Profit determination should be based on expected future profits and not as a
fixed amount or as a percentage of investment.
In case of multi-period PLS contracts, profit ratios can be renegotiated. In such
type of contracts one or more partners can increase their share in the partnership
progressively.Warde (2010).
From a cooperation point of view parties can sacrifice part of their parts as an
incentive to other partners Obaidullah (2005). Subject to agreements between part-
ners, provisional profits can be distributed before maturity of the contract. Also
profits can be retained for future investments. In contrast to a conventional setting
security against losses is not allowed in a PLS contract. However the financier
might require security against misconduct of the partnership manager.
An increasing interest has been shown towards Islamic PLS contracts. In fact
many Islamic windows were opened to match their conventional parts. Such exam-
ples of windows include the FTSE Global Islamic Index in London and Dow Jones
Islamic Market Index in New York Abidi (2009). In addition to this, fund raising
amounted to more than 400 billion US Dollars while investment funds amounted
to 600 US Dollars billion Gierath (2010)
Conventional and Islamic PLS are different in many settings. Islamic PLS
contracts are based on ethical considerations. For example Islamic PLS is non-
interest-based financing and do not engage into illicit projects (gambling, casinos,
and pornography). This restriction, however limits investment opportunities of
Islamic PLS compared to their conventional counterpart
.
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Islamic PLS are more riskier in a sense that the financier is neither allowed to
receive fixed compensation nor it is allowed to receive guarantees against losses.
This may lead to more moral hazards issues manifested in the opportunistic behav-
ior of the PLS managers.
Due to their complexity, this research tries to establish a model that will help
in deciding whether to extend financing to an entrepreneur. The research method-
ology applied include two parts. the first part is theoritical in nature and uses game
theory technique. The puprpose of this startegy is to decide on the best strategy of
each participant (financier and the entrepreneur) in response to the strategy of the
other participant. The second part, takes the results from the game theory analysis
and feed it in a built in simulation model using netlogo. the purpose of using this
simulation tool is to make the decision faster and accurate based on the data entred
by the financier.
Our Paper proposes a PLS contract model that tries to reduce the moral hazard
problem in the form of the entrepreneur undertaking a low effort (Shirking). This
paper tries to develop a model that is both participative and incentive compatible
for both parties using game theory and agent based simulation. to do so we try to
answer the following two questions:
1. Given a specific financier capital contribution can we develop a rational and
incentive compatible equilibrium span of negotiation for the profit sharing ratio in
a PLS contract?
2. Can our model help in deciding whether to accept a financial contract or reject
it?
2. Literature review
Assymetric information between an entrepreneur and a financier manifest it-
self in two ways: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazrads. Adverse selection, which
refers to lack of information about the participants before the contract is estab-
lished. Moral Hazards, refers to the risk that one, some, or all particiapants devi-
ation from their commitments afer the contract. In our paper we are intersted in
reducing moral hazards.
To reduce asymmetric information, that an agent holds against a financier,
many dissipative signals can be used.
One such signal is collateral that efficient agents need to use to signal their
efficient type. This is consistent with works of Berger et al. (2011) and Karim
(2002). While this method is allowed in a conventional system, it is prohibited in
Islamic jurisprudence (Shari’ah law). The recourse to a warranty is allowed only if
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there is a proof of negligence or violation of the terms of the PLS contracts 3.
Benchmarking on collateral, efficient managers might sign for low job protec-
tion (Subramanian and Sheikh, 2002). This is in agreement with other research as
in (Subramanian and Sheikh, 2002).Yet, signing for low job protection is consid-
ered unfair to the entrepreneur since the project failures can be due to some uncon-
trollable factors l(ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2015a),(ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2015b).
Due diligence can be used to reduce moral hazards , in the form of misre-
porting, in Musharakah. However, the extent of it is more in Musharakha than in
conventional PLS Al-Suwailem (2006)
The Entrepreneur’s participation in the project’s capital might be used to reduce
information asymmetries in musharakah contracts(Karim, 2002).In agreement with
this argument, we have allowed the agent to participate in the project capital in our
model.
In dealing with moral hazard, in the form of low effort,Nabi (2013) suggested
a That the entrepreneur should participate with a minimum capital contribution
coupled with a minimum profit sharing ration. In our model we propose we allowed
for more flexibility in this parametre. The model allows the entrepreneur to fix his
capital contribution based on his financial capacity and , based on that, allows him
to negotiate on the profit sharing ratio.
The same research,Nabi (2013) suggested that the entrepreneur suffers a disu-
tility when excercising an effort. We have allowed for such parmetre, in our model,
recognizing the fact that higher effort commands a greater disutility than low effort.
One research suggested that moral hazards can be reduced under Mudaraba4
but cannot be solved under musharakah (YOUSFI, 2013). We can criticize this
argument in the following way. First under Mudaraba, the financier is the sole
provider of capital and subsequently supports all types of risks. On the other hand,
under PLS losses are shared. Our reasonong is consistent with the findings of Nabi
Nabi (2013)and Innes Innes (1990).Furthmore allows for both forms. i.e the en-
trepreneur may or may not participate in the capital of the project.
In a previous paper (ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2015a) of ours we have proposed an
incentive mechanism to reduce asymmetric information. This mechanism results
in higher social value and more entrepreneurial negotiation power in terms of the
profit sharing ratio. The model however does not provide an agent based simula-
tion tool to illustrate it.
3Adoption of AAOIFI Shariah Standard No. 12. Clause 3/1/4/1
4A form of business where the financier provides capital while the entrepreneur provides work
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In dealing with adverse selection and moral hazards, we have provided some
series of publications using two contracts. The purpose is to allow for agents type
separation. In the first paper, we suggested using two types of contracts: one is
effort based and the second is output based. A theoretical evidence showed that an
effort based contract can give higher compensation to the agent as this contract of-
fers a lower sharing ratio to the financierELFakir and Tkiouat (2015b). This result
emphasizes two important Islamic concepts. First it emphasizes the sentiment of
altruism which the financier shows by taking a smaller profit sharing ratio. Second
it emphasizes the sentiment of positive reciprocity which the agent exhibits by pro-
viding high effort.
Our new model goes in line wth our previous research in promoting and inciting
entrepreneurs to perorm higher efforts.
In the second paper, we tried to reduce the adverse selection with respect to
Mudaraba using a model of two contracts combined with adverse selection index
for each contract . We have managed to develop three types of indices that can help
financial institutions in their agent selection process (ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2016a).
In the third paper , we tried to use a two contract concept in a game theoreti-
cal approach under incomplete information . Menu contracting was found not to be
always the optimal option for moral hazard reductionELFakir and Tkiouat (2016b).
Our Main difference from prior literature is to develop an ageent based sim-
ulation that gives the opportunity for profit sharing negotiability and hence the
development of a span of negotiation. the agent based simulation model allows for
faster decision making about whether to extend financing for a PLS contract. this
tool as well is very flexible as all the model parameters can be modified depending
on each users preferences and scenario circumstances. This tool is useful as well in
that it allows for the minimum acceptable profit sharing ratio of each participant.
therfore an interval , or span, of negotiation can be established.
3. The model
Our model strives to reduce the moral hazard problem in a sharing contract be-
tween risk neutral financier and an entrepreneur. The later is willing to undertake a
project which requires funding F. He is endowed with an initial fundA but requires
an additional funding I –A . The success of the project depends on the effort of the
entrepreneur.
The project is estimated to result in a stochastic verifiable output R conditional
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dependent on a high or low managerial effort ei: i ∈ {l, h} :
E(R|ei) =
∫ R
0
Rf(R|ei)dR (1)
Where the share of the entrepreneur is Re and the share of the financier is Rf
such that R = Re + Rf . This output can take upper and lower values depending
on the effort being taken. In fact the output can be R¯ (R) with probability θh (1-
θh) in case of high effort and θl (1 - θl) in case of low efforts.
The manager has a disutilty of effort D(ei) = d(ei).(1− β).I . This disutility
is minifested as a percentage of his investment in the project when excercing effort
ei: i ∈ {l, h}.
A higher disutility is manifested through exercising higher effort such that
D(eh) > D(el)
The manager also has a reservation utility U = u.(1− β).I as a percentage of
his investment in the project.
The expected NPV under the high effort and low effort case are given respec-
tively as:
NPV = θhR− F > 0 (2)
NPV = θlR− F + S < 0 (3)
Assumption1: We assume that under equation 2 the NPV is negative even if the
entrepreneur enjoys some private benefits S when he performs a low effort.
4. Methodology
We consider a one period contract. The entrepreneur and the financier agree on
a partnership contract (x; F, α, β=x) whereby the entrepreneur commits to under-
take a high effort and invest f= (1- x) F. Two sharing ratio α and β such that 0 ≤ β
≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 , are given to the financier in case of success and Loss of the
project respectively as in Nabi [20].
Taking r as the project rate of return, if the project is successful, yielding R¯ =
(1 + r¯).I the share of the financier and Entrepreneur respectively are:
R¯f = αR¯ = α(1 + r¯).I and R¯e = (1− α)R¯ = (1− α)(1 + r¯).I (4)
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If the project is unsuccessful, yielding R = (1 + r).I the share of the financier
and Entrepreneur respectively are:
Rf = βR = βr.I and Re = (1− β)R = (1− β)r.I (5)
We should note the distinguishing characteristic of the model where each par-
ticipant cannot loose more than his/her capital contribution. This a distinguishing
feature from the conventional setting where the financier might demand guarantees
against losses of more than his/her capital contribution.
We start by developing a sharing ratio under managerial observable effort. We
then develop a span of profit sharing ratio in an incomplete information setting
where managerial effort is unoservable. We then provide the rational of our re-
sults using a game theory approach. Finally we test our results using agent based
simulation tool (Netlogo).
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. The model under managerial observable effort
Under this scenario, the manager can’t deviate from providing his commit-
ments of high effort and therefore the financier is in a comparative advantage in
terms of profit sharing ratio negotiations. In other words, the objective of the fi-
nancer is to minimize the remuneration Rm of the manager subject to the manager
breaking even. We can, then, formally express the maximum share share of the
financier (α) as:
α ≤ αPCM = 1− (1− β)1 + dh + u− (1− θh)(1 + r)
θh(1 + r¯)
(6)
5.2. The model under managerial unobservable effort
In this case the financier is facing a situation with regards to the type of the
manager. In other words the financier is questioning whether the manger is going
to excercice a high effort or not while undertaking the project.
so in addition to fulfilling the participation constraints using the sharing ratio
at (6), the financier must also give an incentive so that the entrepreneur is at least
indifferent between exercising low effort (Not Shirking) or exercising low effort
(Shirking).
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5.2.1. Problem preliminaries
We can establish a condition for which the entrepreneur is to perform a high
effort . i.e we must have the Expected profit to the entrepreneur under no shirking
Ue(NS) to be higher than his profit under shirking Ue(S) . i.e
Ue(NS) ≥ Ue(S) which means:
The financier then works out his payoff taking into consideration two probabil-
ities:
• type probabilities Wh: regarding the probability that a manger is going to
perform a high effort.
• performance conditional probabilities: regarding the probability that the project
will be successful conditional on the manager’s effort. in our case, this is θh
under high effort and θl under low effort.
From these two probabilities we can easily infer the joint probability of success
P (S) of the project:
P (S) = Wh.θh + (1−Wh)θl (7)
This situation give rise to private benefits S drawn by the manager if he per-
forms a lower effort. Taking this into consideration, the financier is in a competitive
disadvantage and therefore his objective will be to at least break even.
The contract being assigned need to take into consideration three main con-
straints:
• Participation constraints PCF and PCM: where both participants (Financier
Manger) are at least breaking even.
• Incentive compatibility constraints ICM: where only the manager is offered
a profit sharing ratio that will encourage him to exert high effort rather than
shirking.
So the objective of the financier, using the expectations, rate of returns, percent-
age disutility percentage utilities and percentage private benefits , is to maximize
his return subject to the above mentioned constraints. Formally:
max
R¯f
P (S)α(1 + E(r))I + (1− P (S))β(1 + E(r))I (8)
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subject to constraints:
PCF : P (S)α(1 + E(r))I + (1− P (S))β(1 + E(r))I − βI ≥ 0 (9)
PCM : θh(1−α)(1+E(r))+(1−β)[(1−θh)(1+E(r))−1−d(eh)−u ≥ 0 (10)
ICM : θh(1− α)(1 + E(r)) + (1− β)[(1− θh)(1 + E(r))− 1− d(eh)− u] ≥
θl(1− α)(1 + E(r)) + (1− β)[(1− θh)(1 + E(r))− 1− d(el)− u+ s]
(11)
5.3. Satisfying the Manager’s participative and incentive compatibility constraints
We have already solved for the participation constraints of the manager (PCM)
in equations (6) and (7). We need now to solve for the Incentive constraint of the
manager (INC)
So, the maximum financier share (α) to give an incentive for the entrepreneur to
excert a high effort is :
α ≤ αICM = 1− (1− β)∆θ.(1 + E(r)) + ∆d+ s
∆θ(1 + E(r))
(12)
We can infer then from (9)(22) that For α to be fulfill both the incentive and
the participation constraints , α has to fulfill the following condition:
α ≤ min{αICM ;αPCM} (13)
5.4. Satisfying the Financier’s participative constraints
Now , we turn to the less competitive participant in this game, the financer.
He needs a sharing ratio αpcf that enables him to at least break even. We give
shorthand formula of the integrals of the financier participation constraints (12) by
introducing expectations forms as follows:
P (S)α(1 + E(r¯).I) + (1− P (S))β(1 + E(r).I)− βI (14)
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Solving for α we get:
α ≥ αPCF = β 1− (1− P (S))(1 + E(R))
(1 + E(r¯))P (S)
(15)
from (25) and (23) we can figure out an interval of the sharing ratio α that the
financier should get an which should be satisfying for both parties:
αPCF ≤ α ≤ min{αICM ;αPCM} (16)
5.5. Span of Negotiation
We can notice that there is a span of negotiation SN in terms of the profit
sharing ratio such that :
SN = min{αICM ;αPCM} − αPCF . (17)
The larger is this span of negotiation the more likelihood that a contract can be
materialized. A negative span of negotiation suggests the non-concluding of the
contract.
5.6. a word about the invested capital
Something which emerged against our odds is the non-existence of the invest-
ment parameter I in the equations (6)(20) (25) leading to the decision on the profit
sharing ratio and to the span of negotiation. This shows the irrelevance of the
investment parameter in the analysis we provided.
6. Agent based simulation
6.1. preliminaries
In this section we will provide a case based scenario to illustrate our findings
using an agent based simulation. The usefulness of the simulation tool is that
its decision parameters can be changed to reflect different scenarios settings. We
run the scenarios based o the decision parameters for 1000 simulation to give us
robustness in our decision whether to refuse or accept a financial contract. The
decision to reject or accept a contract depends on the number of void contracts
during our simulation. If the number of void contracts exceed a certain threshold
decided by the simulation’s user then the contract is rejected. the simulation are
parameters are as follows:
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Table 1: The simulation parameters initial values
Parameter Value
Investment 100, 000£
Bank − Contribution 80%
Return− upper − value 50%
Mean− Probability − success/high− effort 80%
Standard−Deviation/High 10%
Return− lower − value −50%
Mean− Probability − success/Low − effort 70%
Standard−Deviation/Low 10%
Mean− probabilityofbeinghigh−manager 10%
Standard− deviation/high−manager 10%
Managerreservationutility 10%
disutilityfromhigheffort 10%
disutilityfromloweffort 10%
The following figure shows the initial outlook of the simulation interface with
the assigned simulation parameters on the left hand side of the figure. The simu-
lation is run 1000 times and the rejection threshold is 30% of void contracts from
the whole simulation.
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Figure 1: The game under initial values of the simulation parameters
The average bank ratio monitors and average manager ratio monitors, repre-
sents the minimum profit ratio the financier and the entrepreneur would accept to
participate in the project.
A bank decision monitor is provided to decide whether to accept or refuse the con-
tract.
A graphical monitor and numerical monitor are shown to display the span of nego-
tiation between the financier and the entrepreneur. The numerical labels under the
agents represent their share of the profit if the project is successful under the high
effort.
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6.2. Running the model under initial simulation values
Launching the model under the initial values gives the following results as
shown on the interface:
Figure 2: The game under initial values of the simulation parameters
The figure shows that despite the span of negotiation being positive , this con-
tract should be refused as the number of void contracts (426) in the simulation is
beyond the threshold of 30 %.
6.3. Running the model under a decrease in banks capital contribution
What can we suggest to make the contract acceptable? One of the answers is
to decrease the contribution of the financier. The usefulness of the model is that
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it allows for a desired decrese in the contribution until an acceptable contract is
reached. The following figure shows the results if the contribution is changed from
80 % to 70%
Figure 3: The game under decrease in banks capital contribution
We can notice that the decrease in the level of bank contribution in our case re-
sults in the contract being marginally acceptable as the percentage of void contracts
matched the rejection threshold of 30%
6.4. The importance of probabilities assessments
One important point to highlight is the sensitivity of the model to probabilities
assessments. In fact proper assessment needs to be done in terms of how likely
the project is to succeed depending on managerial type and performance type. The
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following figure shows the change a slight change of the probability that the agent
is of high type from 50 % to 60 %
Figure 4: The game under an increase in the likelihood of high managerial effort
We can notice that a slight increase in the manager type probability assessment
resulted in the acceptability of the contract while before at 50 % it was refused.
6.5. The importance of volatilities of probabilities assessments
In this case we would like to assess if a high optimism about the success of
project results in a contract acceptance. To do this we run the model under a high
probability of success at 90% but with a higher volatility (from 10% to 30% the
figure bellow shows our results:
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Figure 5: The importance of volatilities of probabilities assessments
In this case we notice that even under high optimism about the success of projct,
a higher volatility of such optimism might result in contract refusal.
7. Conclusion
In this research we have tried to reduce the moral hazard between a financier
and an entrepreneur problem in a profit and loss sharing contract. We tried to
develop a rational and incentive compatible equilibrium span of negotiation for
the profit sharing ratio. The whole mechanism of the PLS contract was developed
using an agent based simulation tool (Netlogo). The purpose of the simulation
was to test whether a PLS contract should be accepted or not in a desired setting.
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We found simulation evidence that an initial refusal or acceptance of a financial
contract can be reversed if a slight adjustment of the model parameters can be
made. The model also suggests that a positive span (see figure 2) of negotiation
does not necessarily guarantee the acceptance of a contract.
Even if the whole parametric values were hypothetical in nature, they can be
re-adjusted to new scenarios allowing for more flexibility in the module. From
a managment practice point of view, we believe that this simulation model can
be a useful tool in profit and loss financial contract decision making. In fact th
model we are proposing can help in making faster decisions regarding whether or
not to extent financing. The model is also flexible as it allows for adjustment of
the parameters depending on the mangerial beliefs and scenarios circumstances.
From an Academic practice point of view, this research fills a gap in the literature
about PLS contracts and can open doors for other extentions. for example, more
participants (entrepreneurs and financiers) in the model game can be added. This
will test how competition over financing can affect the results of the model.
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